a topic that has received relatively little scholarly attention: what constitutes a "work" under copyright law?
I entirely agree with the article's insight, that under modern copyright law the "work" has become a transparent element. In other words, the departure from the physical object, together with the lack of statutory definition and lack of formalities, creates a hidden presumption that the subject matter in question is indeed a "work," so that courts, scholars and policymakers tend to focus on other copyright thresholds. The article also convincingly illustrates that those other thresholds -"originality," specific subject-matter, and even the requirement for a "substantial part" in the context of infringementcannot always replace the need to determine whether a "work" subsists.
The question, it seems, can become acute in at least two sets of circumstances: The first, which is the primary focus of the article, concerns the use of a portion of a larger whole (the larger whole undoubtedly being a copyright work): a page from a book, a few notes of a song, 3 or a frame from a movie. 4 Arguing that each such portion constitutes a separate copyrightprotected work can form a basis not only for a copyright infringement claim, but also for claiming a multiplicity of statutory damages, royalties, etc. In this latter sense, the recognition of the portion as a distinct work can yield different practical results than the recognition of that same portion as a "substantial part" of a larger work. The second incident in which the subsistence of a work is particularly significant concerns the case of "micro-works" (a term coined by Justin Hughes), where the initial subject matter is very small and does not constitute a part of the larger whole, such as very short texts or brief musical compositions.
5
The article uses the image of the "quasi-object" to describe the nature of the copyright work. Indeed, the quasi-object metaphor is helpful in highlighting that the work is (also) a "genre," a "code," and a signifier, rather 575 (2005) (describing U.S. law's reluctance to protect "small" works, and arguing that the lack of protection should be based upon the notion of a "work" rather than upon lack of originality).
than merely a physical object or a "natural" legal kind. 6 Describing the work as a quasi-object further shifts the focus from the "author" and the "origin" of the work to the work itself, its 5,function and its role in social relations. 7 Indeed, like the "genre," the copyright work, too, is fluctuating, constantly changing, and is "doubtless lacking stability."
8 And yet, the modernist use of categories, as described in the article, is unavoidable if copyright law -or any other law for that matterwishes to be general and forward-looking. Returning to the pre-modern "glorious muddle" (to use Prof. Sherman's words) which referred only to specific subject-matter ("books") without using an organizing concept would deprive the law of its much needed flexibility on the one hand, but is unlikely to spare us the need to establish definitions and guidelines on the other hand. Indeed, problems of definition, flexibility and borderline cases arose even under the pre-modern regime.
9 Therefore, although the concept of the work is unstable and even if one cannot hope for bright-line rules, the need to provide guidelines as to "what constitutes a work" is inescapable.
The challenge which the article raises, then, is whether these insights can be translated into doctrinal guidelines. Can the metaphor of the work as a quasi-object assist us in outlining the contours of the work in the difficult cases? Despite the somewhat skeptic tone of the article, I suspect that using its insights may provide a positive answer to the latter questions. In the following paragraphs I do not attempt to propose a complete analysis, but merely a few provisional thoughts in that direction.
First, viewing the work as a quasi-object implies that the test for "what is a copyright work?" cannot be purely quantitative or technical: one cannot decide, for example, that a text consisting of 11 words is a work, while one 6 Cf. Jacque Derrida, The Law of Genre, in ON NARRATIVE 58 (W.J.T.Mitchell ed., 1981) (pointing out that genres are not "natural," "ideal," preexisting forms, but are developed by the creation of particular works, and highlighting the reciprocal relationship between the "form" and "content" Cf. Hughes, supra note 5, at 602 (demonstrating how the term "books" under the Statute of Anne was interpreted broadly by the English courts, so as to include subject matter which was beyond the regular use of the term, such as musical sheets and musical compositions).
consisting of only 6 words is not. Rather, if the work is both a product of relations and social conventions, and also defines such relations, then context and relations should be taken into account. Therefore, the determination whether a work subsists should be a relative one, and an identical subject matter may be considered a work in one context but not in another.
Obviously, the risk of such a relativist approach is ambiguity and lack of predictability. In order to reduce those, we should try to identify the relevant contextual and relational factors. In this context, it seems that one inevitably has to turn to copyright's meta-narratives and underlying rationales for guidance. Thus, for example, in systems which regard incentive as the prevailing copyright narrative, the following factors, though certainly not exhaustive, may be relevant to the distinction between a "work" and a "non-work":
First, when the subject matter in question constitutes a part of a larger whole -such as a sentence in a poem, a frame out of a film or the title of an article -an incentive may not be required for its production, as the incentive for the production of the "larger whole" may be sufficient. The ensuing conclusion may be that the portion is not a separate "work."
Justin Hughes in his article, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, proposed a market-based test in this context: the production and distribution of the subject matter "as such" by the copyright owner indicates that an incentive for its production and dissemination "as such" is required, thus implying the possible subsistence of a separate, independent "work."
10 This proposed test can shed light on the wide recognition of fictional characters as "works," even when detached from the literary, dramatic or artistic context in which they originally appeared.
And lastly, and here I differ from the article's position, it seems that a context-based, incentive-oriented approach does direct us towards tests of integrity, independence, completeness, and perhaps even significance. If the subject matter in question possesses independent qualities and inherent integrity, then an incentive for its production would normally be required, in addition to the personality interest which -as the article correctly observes -would also subsist in such circumstances. Indeed, this last proposed factor requires some judgment of merit and meaning, but only in a very limited sense, which is not alien to copyright law and is prevalent in additional tools in the copyright toolbox, such as the concepts of "fair use" and "substantiality."
11 It seems, then, that courts which have tried to determine the subsistence of a copyright work by referring to its "discrete" 10 Hughes, supra note 5, at 622-27. 11 See, for example, the numerous cases holding that the test for a "substantial part" is
